Hidden variables are extra components added to try to banish counterintuitive features of quantum mechanics. We start with a quantum-mechanical model and describe various properties that can be asked of a hidden-variable model. We present six such properties and a Venn diagram of how they are related. With two existence theorems and three no-go theorems (EPR, Bell, and Kochen-Specker), we show which properties of empirically equivalent hidden-variable models are possible and which are not. Formally, our treatment relies only on classical probability models, and physical phenomena are used only to motivate which models to choose.
Introduction
Begun by von Neumann [35, 1932] , the hidden-variable program in quantum mechanics (QM) adds extra ("hidden") ingredients in order to try to banish some of the counterintuitive features of QM. These features are: (i) the probabilistic nature of quantum behavior, (ii) the possibility of so-called non-local effects between widely separated particles, and (iii) the idea of an intrinsic dependence between the observer of a QM system and the properties of the system itself.
Hidden-variable theories aim to remove these strange aspects of QM by building more "complete" models (in the terminology of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen [16, 1935] ). The completed models should agree with the predictions of QM, but exhibit one or more of the desired properties of: (i) determinism, (ii) locality, and (iii) independence.
Can such models actually be built? The famous "no-go" theorems of QM show that there are severe limitations to what can be done. But it is also true that certain combinations of properties are possible.
Our modest goal in this paper is to provide a formal framework in which various properties one might ask of hidden-variable models can be stated and in which various non-existence and existence results can be organized. Almost all-if not all-of the ingredients of what we do in this paper are well known to researchers in the area. Our contribution, we hope, is in putting all the ingredients into one simple setting.
The setting is classical probability spaces. The question is, given a classical probability model, whether there exists an associated hidden-variable model that is empirically equivalent to the first model and that satisfies certain properties. These properties are motivated by the literature on hidden variables in QM. The specific properties we consider-and the relationships among them-can be depicted in the Venn diagram of The main result of the paper is that we can give a complete account of these 21 regions. For 10 of these regions (indicated with checks), it is always possible to find an equivalent hidden-variable model with the properties in question. For the remaining 11 regions (indicated with crosses), this may not be possible. We fill in the regions via two existence results and three non-existence results.
The latter three are the famous theorems of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) [16, 1935] , 1 Bell [2, It is important to understand that, formally, our paper makes no use of physical phenomena.
It is an exercise in classical probability theory alone. Of course, the probability spaces we select for the non-existence results are inspired by the physical experiments described in EPR, Bell, and
Kocher-Specker. But we hope it is conceptually clarifying to present the hidden-variable question in a purely abstract setting-that is, to show how much follows from the rules of probability theory alone.
Naturally, our account of hidden-variable theory is complete only relative to the properties we consider (there are six of them). These properties are, as far as we can tell, the main ones considered in the literature. (As we explain later, we have added one definition.) In particular, Bell Locality ( [2, 1964] ) is equivalent to the conjunction of Outcome and Parameter Independence (Jarrett [23, 1984] , stated here as Proposition 2.1). Kochen-Specker [24, 1967] Non-Contextuality is implied by the conjunction of Parameter Independence and λ-Independence (Proposition 2.2). But there may well be other interesting properties to put on hidden-variable models, which would lead to an extension
There are, of course, many treatments of the hidden-variable question. (Prominent examples include Belinfante [1, 1973] , Gudder [21, 1988] , Mermin [27, 1993] , Peres [29, 1990] , and van Fraassen [34, 1991] .) This paper is not meant to be a comprehensive survey. Our goal is, in a sense, the reverse. It is to start with the rules of probability theory alone and ask-relative to the six properties
we consider-what is or is not possible. For this task, we need only EPR, Bell, and Kochen-Specker.
But we do mention later some other no-go results in QM (not needed to complete Figure 1 .1).
Two comments on the particular framework we present. First, we work with a single probability measure on a single space, where points in the space describe measurements on particles and outcomes of those measurements. An alternative-more conventional-approach would be to use a family of probability measures on a space describing outcomes only, with different probability measures corresponding to different measurements. 2 In fact, all our requirements are stated in terms of conditional probabilities: If such-and-such a measurement is made, then what is the probability of a certain outcome? The distinction between the approaches might therefore seem small-both involve families of probability measures. But it matters. If we had started from a family of probability measures rather than a single measure, we would not have been able to derive all the relationships between properties shown in Figure 1 .1 without making some additional assumptions. 3 So, formally, our approach is more parsimonious. Yet, it does add an ingredient at the conceptual level-viz., the existence of a probability measure prior to conditioning on measurements. This measure may be thought of as representing the perspective of a super-observer who observes the experimenters as well as the outcomes of the experiments. Does the existence of such a measure contradict the free will of an experimenter in deciding what measurements to make? We don't think so-because, as we said, we work only with the conditionals. Still, even if it plays a very small role in our treatment, the idea of such a measure seems deserving of further study. We leave this as beyond the scope of the current paper.
A second choice we make in our framework is to treat only finite probability spaces. This involves a tradeoff. On the one hand, finiteness allows us to avoid all measure-theoretic issues. On the other hand, as an assumption on the space in which a hidden variable lives, finiteness is undoubtedly restrictive. To be precise, the first of our two existence theorems needs only a finite space in any case, but, under finiteness, the second can treat only rational probabilities. (We sketch the extension of our second theorem, using an infinite space, to all probabilities.) Of course, finiteness makes our versions of the no-go theorems weaker.
We derive Figure 1 .1 in the body of the paper. Before that, though, let us offer a comment on its conceptual meaning in QM. The main message of the no-go theorems is that in building a hidden-variable theory, some properties that might be viewed as desirable-at least, a priori-have to The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the framework and basic definitions. Section 3 presents two existence theorems on hidden-variable models. Sections 4-6 present EPR [16, 1935] , Bell [2, 1964] , and Kochen-Specker [24, 1967] in our probability-theoretic framework. Section 7 mentions some other impossibility results in QM not covered in this paper.
Here is the hidden-variable question in a bit more detail. Start with a model of an experiment done in QM. Sometimes, the experiment will consist of measurements performed on several entangled particles. Or, the experiment might involve several measurements performed on a single particle.
The model describes the set-up and outcome of the experiment and so will be called an "empirical model." The question is whether one can find a hidden-variable model-i.e., a model involving additional ("hidden") variables-which is empirically equivalent to the first model and which has desired properties. By "empirically equivalent" we mean that the two models make the same (probabilistic) prediction about outcomes.
Formally, we consider a space
The variables A, B, C, . . . are measurements, and the variables a, b, c, . . . are associated outcomes of measurements. There might be several particles: Ann performs a measurement on her particle, Bob performs a measurements on his particle, . . . . Or, Ψ might describe a case where several measurements are performed on one particle. The definitions to come apply in either case. We take each of the spaces in Ψ to be finite, and suppose that Ψ is a finite product.
Let Λ be a finite space in which a hidden variable λ lives. 4 The overall space is then
Definition 2.1 An empirical model is a pair (Ψ, q), where q is a probability measure on Ψ. A hidden-variable model is a pair (Ω, p), where p is a probability measure on Ω.
Essentially, we employ the probability measures q and p once conditioned on one or more measurements. Still, as we said in the Introduction, we cannot quite dispense with the unconditional q and p, and work instead with a family of probability measures indexed by measurements (one family for q and one for p). If we did, we would lose Lemmas 2.1 and 2.4-and hence certain relationships in Figure 1 .1. These relationships seem intuitively correct to us, so we prefer a formalism in which they can be derived. With an indexed family of measures, we would have to impose rather than derive these relationships.
The models of Definition 2.1 stand alone. However, we are also interested in stating when different models are equivalent: Here, we write "a, b, c, . . ." as a shorthand for the event
in Ω, and similarly for other expressions. We will adopt this shorthand throughout.
The non-nullness condition is simply to ensure that any measurements (A, 
.).
Substituting this in Definition 2.2, we see that the idea of equivalence is to reproduce a given probability measure q on the space Ψ by averaging under a probability measure p on an augmented
space Ω, where Ω includes a hidden variable. The measure p is then subject to various conditions (described below).
One more basic definition: This condition says that the hidden variable can take on only one value. In effect, this condition doesn't allow hidden variables. We include it because EPR will be usefully formulated this way. (This term is from Dickson [14, 2005, p.140] .) The condition says that the process determining the value of the hidden variable is independent of which measurements are chosen. Determinism is a basic condition in the literature. But we are careful to make a distinction between a strong and weak form. We will see that various results are true for one form but false for another. Broadly, the condition is that the hidden variable determines (almost surely) the outcomes of measurements. But, Strong Determinism says this holds measurement-by-measurement, while Weak Determinism says this holds only once all measurements are specified. There is a one-way implication:
Lemma 2.1 If a hidden-variable model satisfies Strong Determinism, then it satisfies Weak Determinism.
The result now follows from the following easy fact in probability theory: Let E 1 , . . . , E n and and similarly with a and b interchanged, etc.
Outcome Independence is taken from Jarrett [23, 1984] and Shimony [31, 1986] . It says that conditional on the value of the hidden variable and the measurements undertaken, the outcome of any one measurement is (probabilistically) unaffected by the outcomes of the other measurements. 
Proof. Standard; see, e.g., Chung [9, 1974 Parameter Independence is also from Jarrett [23, 1984] and Shimony [31, 1986] . It says that, conditional on the value of the hidden variable, the outcome of any one measurement depends (probabilistically) only on that measurement and not on the other measurements.
Lemma 2.4 If a hidden-variable model satisfies Strong Determinism, then it satisfies Parameter
Independence. Combinations of some of these properties give the well-known properties of Locality and NonContextuality. First is Locality, formulated by Bell [2, 1964] . In words, a hidden-variable model satisfies Locality if the probability of getting some tuple of outcomes factorizes under the measurements. Non-Contextuality, due to Kochen-Specker [24, 1967] , is a property of an empirical model. It says that the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement does not depend on the other measurements performed. 
Two Existence Theorems
We next prove two existence theorems for hidden-variable models which say what type of properties can always be found:
E1 Given any empirical model, there is an equivalent hidden-variable model which satisfies Strong Determinism.
E2 Given any empirical model, there is an equivalent hidden-variable model which satisfies Weak
Determinism and λ-Independence.
That is, each of these sets of conditions on a hidden-variable theory can always be satisfied.
They cannot be impeded by any no-go theorems. Figure 3 .1 repeats part of Figure 1 .1, putting a check in a region where there is always an equivalent hidden-variable model with the properties that hold in that region. The checks are followed by E1 and/or E2 which say which existence theorem pertains to that region.
(The region for Single-Valuedness alone also has a check. Proof. We give the proof for the case that Ψ is a 4-way product, but the extension to a general (finite) product will be clear. Set By Theorem 3.1, there is a hidden-variable model (Ω, p) which is equivalent to (Ψ, q) and which satisfies Strong Determinism. But (Ω, p) is also equivalent to (Ω, p).
We state the next existence result for the case of rational probabilities, to enable us to prove it with a finite set Λ. After the proof, we sketch the extension to all probabilities. Theorem 3.2 Given an empirical model (Ψ, q) with rational probabilities, there is an equivalent hidden-variable model (Ω, p) which satisfies Weak Determinism and λ-Independence.
The idea of the proof is to have the hidden variable live on the (discretized) unit interval, and then to split up the interval according to relevant probabilities.
Proof. We give a proof for the case that Ψ is a 4-way product, but the argument clearly extends. 
for some integers r ijkl ≥ 0 and s ijkl > 0.
Let Λ have N points, where
We let p be uniform on N , and then form the product on {A, A , . . .} × {B, B , . . .} × Λ. Thus, λ-Independence is satisfied.
Still fixing (A i , B j ), we 'assign' to (a k , b l ) the number of points
Formally, we mean that for each of these points,
Thus, Weak Determinism is satisfied. Note that, again for fixed (A i , B j ), the probability of choosing one of these points is
and so
establishing equivalence.
lent hidden-variable model (Ω, p) which satisfies Weak Determinism and λ-Independence.
Proof. As for Corollary 3.1, using Theorem 3.2 in place of Theorem 3.1.
We could handle irrational probabilities in Theorem 3. b 1 ) , . . . , (a n , b n )}. Partition Λ as in Figure 3 
EPR
We have seen that certain types of hidden-variable model are always possible. Next come the no-go theorems, expressed in our framework. These show that no other type of hidden-variable model (among those covered by our six conditions) is necessarily possible.
Here is the first no-go theorem, due to EPR [16, 1935] , expressed in our framework. (Our formulation is very similar to that in Norsen [28, 2004] .) Figure 4 .1 adds crosses to Figure 3 .1, in accordance with the EPR result.
Note that, as with our other statements, EPR as given here is a simple result in probability theory. But the notation we use in the empirical model is meant to reflect the underlying physical set-up which was of interest to EPR. (More precisely, it reflects Bohm's [5, 1951] Proof. We let
and define q as in Figure 4 .2: 
contradicting Outcome Independence. Outcome Independence) and even λ-Independence. Let Λ = {λ 1 , λ 2 }, and set p(
Using p(A, B) = 1, we see that the stated conditions hold.
At the level presented here, the EPR argument doesn't need any quantum effects. It could be realized entirely classically. Von Neumann [36, 1936] gave a nice example of classical action at a distance:
Let S 1 and S 2 be two boxes. One knows that 1, 000, 000 years ago either a white ball had been put into each or a black ball had been placed into each but one does not know which color the balls were. Subsequently one of the boxes (S 1 ) was buried on Earth, the other (S 2 ) on Sirius . . . . Now one digs S 1 on Earth out, opens it and sees: the ball is white. This action on Earth changes instantaneously the S 2 statistic on Sirius . . . .
In the QM context, EPR's conclusion was that the theory of QM needed to be "completed."
This leads to the question of whether a construction like the one we just gave is always possible.
This then leads to Bell's Theorem. Once more, our formulation is in probability terms alone. In the Bell experiment, Ann (resp. Bob)
can make measurements of spin on her (resp. his) entangled particle in three directions. For each measurement, the only possible outcome is positive or negative spin. If the measurements are made in the same direction, the results will be anti-correlated ( Figure 5 .2). Figure 5 .3 gives the probabilities of the different outcomes of the measurements, when these are made in different directions. The probabilities in Figure 5 .3 are essentially quantum-mechanical.
Theorem 5.1 (Bell [2, 1964] ) There is an empirical model (Ψ, q) for which there is no equivalent hidden-variable model (Ω, p) which satisfies λ-Independence, Parameter Independence, and Outcome Independence.
Another phrasing (using Proposition 2.1): There is no equivalent hidden-variable model which satisfies λ-Independence and Locality.
Proof. We let
and define q as in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, with q(A i , B j ) = 1 9 for all i, j. 
whenever λ ∈ M .
Using (5.1) and (5.2), we see that for each i, there are disjoint sets
Similar to above, observe that
Using (5.3) (for i and j) in (5.4) we get
A parallel argument yields
Now use Figure 5 .3 to get
whenever i = j. Figure 5 .4 (2, 3) , and (3, 1) respectively, yields
which is impossible.
Can we drop any of the conditions of Bell's Theorem? By Theorem 3.1, we cannot drop λ-Independence. By Theorem 3.2, we cannot drop Parameter Independence.
For the Bell empirical model, we also cannot drop Outcome Independence. To see this, let Λ = {λ}. Then λ-Independence is satisfied. Define p on Ψ × {λ} from q on Ψ, as in Remark 3.1.
We then have
so that Parameter Independence is satisfied. Of course, Outcome Independence fails, as it must.
For example:
By contrast, the Kochen-Specker Theorem produces an impossibility even without Outcome Independence.
Kochen-Specker
The Kochen-Specker [24, 1967] no-go result adds crosses to Figure 5 .1, to give a complete picture as in Figure 1 .1.
At the physical level, the Kochen-Specker experiment differs from those in the past two sections in considering measurements on only one particle. There are many presentations of Kochen-Specker, of course. We follow Cabello, Estebaranz, and Garcìa-Alcaine [8, 1996] , a simple treatment which results in the 4 × 9 array of Table 6 .1 (also presented in Held [22, 2000] ). For various tuples of four orthogonal directions in 4-space (from a total of 18 directions), we ask whether or not the particle has spin in each of these directions. In each case, the answer will be that we get three directions without spin and only one direction with spin. To state Kochen-Specker in our probabilistic framework, we will need to adapt the concept of exchangeability from probability theory (de Finetti [11, 1937] , [12, 1972] ). To give our definition, we consider the special case where the spaces of possible measurements are all the same, as are the spaces of possible outcomes:
for integers m, n. We will consider a permutation map π:
Note that we use π twice (despite the different domains), because we want to consider the same permutation on the two sequences. 
for any permutation π, and when both are non-zero,
In words, the requirement is that if we swap any number of measurements, then, as long as we swap the outcomes in the same way, the overall probability is unchanged. Thus, let q be the probability that Ann gets the outcome x j1 and Bob gets the outcome x j2 , if Ann performs measurement X i1 on her particle and Bob performs measurement X i2 on his particle. Let q be the probability that Ann gets the outcome x j2 and Bob gets the outcome x j1 , if Ann performs measurement X i2 on her particle and Bob performs measurement X i1 on his particle. Exchangeability says that q = q.
Likewise, for several measurements on a single particle. This is similar to exchangeabilityà la de Kochen-Specker demonstrated the existence of a QM model that fails Non-Contextuality: Whether or not their particle has spin in a certain direction is dependent on which other directions are also measured. The property of spin for such a particle does not stand alone. As the proof makes clear, Theorem 6.1 is really a corollary to their result. Exchangeability is assumed to hold, and q assigns positive probability to each of the nine tuples of measurement settings.
Finally, for any column, the empirical model has the property that precisely one of the following holds: which tells us about the fifth column. We therefore get a coloring problem: We try to color precisely one entry in each column-corresponding to the measurement that yields a 1. For example, suppose we color the entry E 2 in the first column-corresponding to (6.5). Then (6.6) tells us that we must color the entry E 2 in the fifth column. However, this is impossible. Each E i appears an even number of times in Table 6 .1, and there is an odd number of columns. Thus, the table cannot be colored.
Other No-Go Theorems
There are many important papers on the no-go question not touched upon here. These include Fine [17, 1982] , [18, 1982] , Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger [20, 1989 ], Malley and Fine [25, 2005] , Mermin [26, 1990] , [27, 1993] , Peres [29, 1990] , [30, 1991] , and Szabo and Fine [32, 2002] . Again, our purpose is not to survey the literature. Rather, it is to give a complete picture of Figure 1 .1 and all its 21 regions. As Figure 1 .1 shows, just the three basic no-go theorems are needed for the six
properties that we present.
The absence of Gleason's Theorem ( [19, 1957] ) from our paper is a consequence of our choice not to impose any structure on our spaces (refer back to Footnote 4). In particular, we do not work in Hilbert space. Of course, Gleason's Theorem immediately implies the existence of the Kochen-Specker QM model (which we used in our Theorem 6.1).
The recent no-go theorem of Conway and Kochen [10, 2006 ] generalizes Kochen-Specker by relaxing Parameter Independence. Consider a two-particle system. The requirement is that, conditional on the value of the hidden variable, the outcome of any particular measurement Ann makes on her particle may depend (probabilistically) on the other measurements she makes but not on the measurements Bob makes on his particle. We could accommodate this result by adding a seventh property-a generalized parameter independence-to our six, but refrain from pursuing this extension here.
Finally, we note the connection to Bohmian mechanics (Bohm [6, 1952] ). Dürr-Goldstein-Zanghì [15, 2004, p.993] explain: "In Bohmian mechanics the result obtained at one place at any given time will in fact depend upon the choice of measurement simultaneously performed at the other place." Indeed, Theorem 3.2 says that provided one is prepared to give up Parameter Independence, one can reproduce any empirical model-under λ-Independence and Weak Determinism. Theorem 3.1 says that if one is prepared to give up λ-Independence, one can get even Strong Determinism. In a sense, then, these results 'predict' the possibility of Bohmian mechanics-though not its specific content, of course.
